Russia is actively working to preserve the legacy of achievements of its paramilitary Wagner Group and expand its influence in several African countries. This effort has gained momentum, particularly after the success of recent military coups in the African Sahel region, which have resulted in the emergence of military elites who are aligned with Moscow.
By establishing a foothold in these countries, Russia is able to secure significant strategic advantages. This includes the acquisition of military bases and intelligence stations, which serve to support its influence and protect its diverse interests across the continent.
However, these opportunities and gains also increase the likelihood of friction between Russia and several Western powers, particularly France, which has lost a significant portion of its traditional influence and bases in the Sahel region. In response, Paris is considering deploying French troops to the Ukrainian arena as a form of counterpressure. Additionally, friction with the United States is expected, as evidenced by the current situation at Airbase 101 in Niger's international airport in Niamey.
Strategic Restructuring
Following the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023 due to a mutiny against the Kremlin, the group underwent a significant reorganization, leading to the formation of the new paramilitary entity known as Africa Corps. This newly formed group operates under direct military command, with oversight from the Russian Ministry of Defense and Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. Notably, Africa Corps has deployed its forces to five African countries: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic, and Libya, the latter serving as the group's headquarters. The selection of these locations was primarily driven by geopolitical objectives, including the facilitation of logistical supply lines for Russian troops stationed in Africa. It is noteworthy that the Africa Corps predominantly comprises former Wagner fighters who hold key leadership positions within the group and are accorded preferential treatment as prioritized recruits.
In January 2024, Russia deployed 100 military personnel to Burkina Faso to protect interim President Ibrahim Traoré from assassination attempts. An additional 200 soldiers are expected to join later. Subsequently, Africa Corps troops arrived in Niger on April 12, 2024, and on April 17, 2024, Rusich, a subunit affiliated with Wagner, shared photos and videos on its Telegram channel, showcasing a shipment of vehicles and weapons for the Africa Corps. The shipment was delivered by the ships Ivan Gren and Alexander Otrakovsky to Tobruk port in Libya.
Various Objectives
Russia has recently established the New Africa Corps with the aim of expanding its influence in Africa and accomplishing a variety of objectives. These goals are outlined below:
1. Selective recruitment and employment:
The Africa Corps was formed after an extensive recruitment effort, primarily conducted through social media platforms such as VKontakte and various Telegram channels associated with the Russian army or private military companies. The campaign targeted specialists, with the Africa Corps's Telegram channel advertising for artillery professionals, drone operators, electronic warfare specialists, assault forces, tank combat veterans, and P-18 radar station operators. Prospective recruits were offered a six-month contract with a salary of 240,000 rubles (equivalent to more than $3,330) and life insurance. Following the merger of Wagner Group operations in August 2023, the Kremlin revised its initial mobilization target from 40,000 soldiers to 20,000 by the end of 2023.
2. Securing Russian interests and countering Western presence in Africa:
The Africa Corps is strategically countering Western influence in Africa by seizing control of valuable resources and assets. International reports suggest that the Wagner Group, acting on behalf of Moscow, has taken over several gold mines in Mali and the Central African Republic in recent years. These seized assets are slated to be handed over to the Africa Corps, which has already commenced securing control of key gold mines, including the Intahaka mine in northern Mali, in collaboration with local military forces since February 2024. Furthermore, the presence of untapped uranium reserves in the northeast has also drawn attention, with reports indicating that the Russian-supported military attack on Kidal may be linked to the potential exploitation of these reserves. Notably, in October 2023, representatives from the Russian state nuclear company Rosatom held discussions with Malian officials regarding the development of the country's nuclear infrastructure and energy sector, along with providing assistance for local research facilities and staff training.
3. Providing security and training services to African governments:
Russian President Putin asserts himself as a security ally and protector of regimes in the African Sahel countries (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), the Central African Republic, and Libya through the Africa Corps. These nations are in need of security assistance due to the withdrawal of foreign counter-terrorism forces, waning Western and French military support, unprecedented security challenges arising from political instability, escalating terrorist activities, and increasing armed conflicts and civil wars.
4. Avoiding a repeat of the Wagner mutiny:
The transition from Wagner Group's relative independence to direct Kremlin oversight of the Africa Corps aims to prevent internal rebellion, as evidenced by Yevgeny Prigozhin's son, Pavel Prigozhin. After his father's death, Pavel initially led thousands of Wagner mercenaries and is reportedly still involved with a smaller group of fighters loyal to his father. Reports indicate that he likely commands some forces in the Central African Republic and Mali, which implies a new agreement between the Kremlin or Russian military intelligence and Pavel to prevent a repeat of his father's actions without granting him full control of the group.
5. Improving the image of Russia’s security operations in Africa:
International reports, often regardless of their accuracy, have consistently associated Wagner with major violations in Mali and the Central African Republic, such as killings, attacks on civilians, looting, and mass executions. French reports have linked Wagner and the Malian army to the massacre of numerous civilians during counter-terrorism operations in the Moura massacre in central Mali in March 2021. As a result, the new Russian mercenary group aims to enhance Moscow's reputation and present a revised image of its involvement in Africa.
Opportunities and Constraints
There are several repercussions and reflections resulting from the presence of the Africa Corps' forces. These can be outlined as follows:
1. Facilitating the logistics network for Russian forces:
The Africa Corps' presence in Niger will significantly reduce the distances between its North African and sub-Saharan positions. If the Russian Africa Corps gains control of the US base in Agadez, their base will be located within 1,100 miles or less of Russia-controlled airbases in Libya, including the Jufra base, which acts as a stopover before heading south to African countries. Additionally, it will be just over the same distance from Russia’s main bases in Mali's capital to the west and the Central African Republic’s capital to the southeast.
2. Threatening NATO’s security from the South:
In December 2023, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited Libya to further the Africa Corps's agenda and explore the possibility of using the coastal city of Tobruk in eastern Libya as a base for Russian naval ships. In February 2024, former Italian Chief of Defence General Staff Vincenzo Camporini suggested that Russia might deploy nuclear submarines to Libya, drawing parallels to the Soviet Union's missile deployment in Cuba in 1962. Such a move could potentially disrupt the security framework of the Mediterranean Basin, as Moscow could leverage the ports of Sirte and Ras Lanuf to establish naval bases and extend its influence in the region.
3. Moscow’s leverage over European security:
The expanding Russian influence and military presence in Niger could provide Moscow with additional leverage to threaten Europe. By securing access to uranium deposits in Niger in exchange for military assistance, Russia could expand its stake in the global nuclear energy market, given that Niger is the world's seventh-largest producer of uranium. Furthermore, Moscow may seek to exploit its bases in northern Niger to take advantage of migrant smuggling routes across the Sahara, consequently amplifying illegal migration flows into Europe. Concerns have been raised by the EU Border Agency and various European officials that Russia might be orchestrating larger refugee movements from Africa to destabilize Europe, influence elections, and undermine military backing for Ukraine. The agency highlighted that in 2023, 380,000 migrants attempted to enter Europe from Libya, marking the highest number of illegal migrants since 2016. While it may be improbable for Russia to control all of these operations, European reports tend to attribute nearly all threats in the African arena to Moscow.
4. Friction between Africa corps forces and AFRICOM:
Potential clashes between Russian and American forces in Niger are imminent. Recent field reports suggest that Africa Corps troops have encroached upon areas under the control of US forces in Niger. Although there has been no direct engagement or conflict between Russian and American forces, both are utilizing distinct sectors of Airbase 101 near Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey. This close proximity could result in the displacement of either party or, in the worst-case scenario, lead to continued cohabitation as neighbors.
5. Exploiting regional tensions:
Algeria and Morocco are engaged in a competitive pursuit to gain access to the Sahel region through a series of developmental initiatives focused on cross-border trade and infrastructure. This rivalry is fueled by Morocco's strategic objective to capitalize on Algeria's waning influence in the region, a consequence of recent tensions with Mali and the collapse of the Algiers peace agreement in northern Mali.
In light of these developments, there is a potential for Moscow to strengthen the alliance between the Sahel states and Algeria, which enjoys favorable relations with Russia. This strategic move could serve Russia's vital interests by utilizing Algerian ports as a gateway to the Sahel, ultimately enabling access to the Russian military base in the Central African Republic.
A New Phase
The presence of the Africa Corps indicates a more open revelation of Russia's agenda following a period of unofficial Wagner activities. This shift signifies a new phase in Russia's security strategy in Africa, moving the focus of Russian operations from the Central African Republic to the Sahel region and Libya.
However, the Africa Corps faces a strategic dilemma in repurposing Wagner to achieve its agenda without compromising its effectiveness and reach. This complexity is further heightened by the fact that cooperation with the Libyan army conflicts with efforts to maintain relations with the Libyan government in Tripoli, especially for Russian companies operating in the oil and energy sectors.
While the Africa Corps may achieve temporary breakthroughs by establishing a presence in several Sahel countries, this success does not guarantee a decisive victory in the battle for stability against the American presence. The region remains highly volatile, and it is unlikely that Washington will easily back down without finding suitable alternatives or reaching a deal to stay engaged.
